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Abstract: As an essential institution to the practice of national payment flow, banks 
always confront with various risk exposures inherent in them. An interbank 
interactions through interbank money market might yield higher systemic risks that 
can lead to a default. This study aims at determining the contagion effects towards 
Indonesian banks. This study used 18 bank samples who provided annual reports 
from 2007 to 2016. The measurement of the systemic risks was performed by using 
financial contagion risk index and was tested using Vector Autoregression method. 
Results show that there was a one-way causality pattern between banks as the 
research samples, covering BCA with Bank Mayapada, Bank Maybank, Bank Mega, 
and Bank Resona Perdania and also Bank CIMB Niaga with BCA, BRI, BNI, BTN, 
Commonwealth Bank, J-Trust Bank, Bank KEB Hana, Bank Mega, and Bank Permata. 
Meanwhile, two-way causality occurs between Bank BCA and Bank Mandiri and 
vice versa. In addition, the impact of the risk pressure of a bank is not always 
positive, however, it is also negative in some cases, which means that the bank can 
take advantage of the shocked conditions experienced by other banks. 
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Introduction 
 
Banks have an important position in the national economic system. Its role 
is getting broader with a variety of services offered that provides 
convenience to the public, especially in case of financial matters. Moreover, 
a bank also has various risks inherent in it. In coping with the banking crisis 
occurred, banks become a flimsy institution due to the various exposures 
they have. Financial institutions have an exposure effect towards each 
other that can be seen from the practice of interbank market. Meaning 
that, a failure occurred in one institution will be contagious and cause 
further failures in other institutions which run similar business models 
(Kapoor, 2010; 19-20). 
 
Ayomi and  Hermanto (2013) explain that systemic risk causes failure of one 
or several financial institutions as a result of systemic events due to 
financial system imperfections such as asymmetric information, agency  
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problems, and moral hazard. Those things will cause excessive risk-taking behavior, 
contagion risk (domino effect), and financial intermediation. 
 
Zakaria (2015) explains that the contagion effects can come from finance and economics. 
Financial contagion occurs because the agents in domestic and international financial 
systems are interconnected through the transactions in the financial market, either 
directly or indirectly. One condition that triggers systemic risk is bank run. Simorangkir 
(2011) defines bank run as an event in which many customers simultaneously withdraw 
funds on a large scale conducted as soon as possible in a certain bank because the 
customer does not longer believe the bank’s performance. Consequently, this condition 
might turn into a banking crisis if the bank run occurred in one bank has been transmitted 
to another bank, known as a contagious effect. Schoenmaker (1996) defines banking 
contagion risk as the condition of financial difficulties in one or more banks that are 
transmitted to a number of other larger banks or financial systems. The contagion effect 
can spread through information or credit channels. 
 
Some researchers have undertaken research on banking contagion effects. Aharony and 
Swary (1983) examined the possibility of a contagion effect using capital market when a 
bank failure in the US occurred. The results show that there is little evidence of the 
contagion due to the failure of three major banks in the US. It happened because during 
the transmission period, the central bank played an active role as a lender of the last 
resort so that the impact of transmission failure can be reduced. This caused doubts for 
banking experts leading to the idea that the contagion effect had no significant impact 
towards banking stability. 
 
Meanwhile, Zakaria (2015) conveys that systemic risk is a big source of risk. There were 
banks in Morocco have potential systemic problems, such as ATW and BMCE. Grais and 
Rajhi (2015) also prove that Islamic financial institutions could potentially experience the 
contagion risk in different degrees. The Islamic financial institutions face certain risks 
related to Sharia principles in their business activities. Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon 
(2010) explain that the banking sector can be a source of systemic risk compared to other 
financial institutions. Bank liquidity and the fact that the banking sector is not designed to 
withstand large and rapid losses, make this sector vulnerable to systemic risk. Gauthier, 
He, and Souissi (2010) used bank liquidity to see its effect towards bank systemic risk and 
found that the network effects and liquidity risk were the main causes of systemic risk in 
the banking system. 
 
Moreover, Upper (2011) describes the simulation method used to predict the potential 
contagion found in the interbank loan market. Similarly, Chinazzi and Fagiolo (2013) used 
a network theory to observe the contagion and systemic risk in the financial markets. 
Results show that the relationship or interaction between banks and financial institutions 
can strengthen the shock of the economic system during the crisis period. 
 
Based on the description, this study aims at determining the causal relationship between 
banks in Indonesia and examine whether shocks in a bank will cause similar effects to 
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other banks within the banking system in Indonesia. The study was conducted using the 
Granger’s causality test method. 
 
Globalization leads to the connections between financial institutions and money markets 
both domestically and internationally. This causes the collapse of a financial institution in 
one country, which might spread to other institutions or countries (Shah, 1997), of which 
the phenomenon is often called as contagion or systemic risk. In the crisis period, the 
probability of default from several financial institutions will increase the default on other 
financial institutions. It means that when financial institutions experience distress, other 
similar institutions will experience shocks, which is further contagious (Zakaria, 2015). 
Such phenomenon is similar to the domino effect because the fall of an institution leads 
to the fall of other institutions in a row. On a broader scale, the collapse of a certain bank 
in a country will cause stress to the banking institutions and other financial institutions in 
other countries. It can be seen in the 2008 US crisis which later spread becoming global 
financial crisis. 
 
Rescue costs for banks that experience stressed conditions in preventing the systemic 
collapse are quite large. Shah (1997) states that these costs can reach millions to billions 
of pounds, so there is a need for research in this field as an effort to prevent the 
occurrence of systemic risk transmission. There are several studies that have been 
conducted to determine the cause of the contagion effect. Most researchers realize that 
the interbank market is the most important risk distribution channel for banks and other 
financial institutions (Memmel & Sachs, 2013). Moreover, the distribution channel can 
also occur in the context of liquidity and refinancing (Schoenmaker, 1996). 
 
One of the studies examining transmission of shocks from the interbank market side was 
conducted by Philippas, Koutelidakis, & Leontitsis (2015) who adapted the Barabási –
Albert model (BA model). The shocks in small banks caused huge losses in a whole so that 
there was a need for a crisis restraint policy. The interbank networks can be used to 
explain the shocks and the correlation between the banking sectors. 
 
Gai, Haldane, and Kapadia (2011) and Gauthier, et al. (2010) empirically examined the 
distribution channel from a banking crisis in terms of the liquidity. Gai, et al. (2011) 
developed an interaction network model in order to find out how the channel of liquidity 
shock spread in the banking system. The results show that the concentration and 
complexity are the main causes of the fragility of the financial institutions until they are 
able to be the channel which spread shocks in the economic cycle. 
 
In general, Aharony and Swary (1983) distinguish the spread of contagion effects through 
information and credit channels. The spread of contagion effects through information 
channels is divided into pure and noisy contagion. Pure contagion occurs when negative 
information such as fraud and investment losses on certain risks that occur in a bank 
adversely affect all banks, including the banks that have no connection with the first bank. 
Noisy contagion occurs when a bank's failure shows a bad signal for some other banks 
with similar characteristics. If a bank fails, the other banks with similar asset structures 
and liabilities will also likely experience bank runs. Meanwhile, the spread of contagion 
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effects through credit channels can occur due to the existence of interbank markets, over-
the-counter (OTC) derivative markets, and payment systems. 
 
The spread of contagion risk can also occur through foreign exchange transactions in the 
market and the fair value of financial assets (De Bandt & Hartmann, 2000). It is because 
the foreign exchange and security transactions have two sides, namely the transfer of 
assets on one hand and payments on the other, which both lead to the exposure of credit 
and liquidity risks. The research framework in this study refers to the previous study 
conducted by Christiawan and Arfianto (2013), which had similar subjects and research 
methods. Therefore, based on the previous research and literary objectives, the 
hypotheses proposed in this study are stated as follows: 
 
H1 : There is a causal relationship between interbank banking pressures  
 
H2 : There is an effect of shocks on bank i towards bank j 
 
 
Research Method 
 
This study aimed at determining the contagion risk in several banks in Indonesia. The 
calculation of the contagion risk was done through the use of composite index taking 
three variables into account: 
 
The comparison between the placements to other banks and deposit 
 
This variable indicated that the banks had account interactions with other banks 
(interbank deposits) so that this indicator could be used to measure the bank's 
vulnerability towards the contagion risk in the interbank market. The formula is: 
 
𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
The differences between the increase of fair-value financial asset and the total assets 
 
This variable was used to assess the resilience of the bank through the total assets 
towards the shocks that occurred in the securities market. The formula is: 
 
differences between the increase of fair − value financial asset
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
 
 
The differences between foreign exchange transactions and the total assets 
 
This variable was used to measure the bank's resilience through its total assets in 
responding to the shocks on the foreign exchange market. The formula is: 
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The differences between foreign exchange transactions 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
 
 
Those three variables were used to measure the financial contagion risk indicator 
(Christiawan & Arfianto, 2013). The indicator was in a form of an index used to measure 
the systemic risk between banks and the channels of transmission through the interbank 
money market, foreign exchange transactions, and the fair value of financial assets in the 
banks. The research population covered all conventional banks in Indonesia. Meanwhile, 
the samples used in this study were banks that provided financial reports from 2007-2016. 
Therefore, based on that characteristic, there were 18 banks taken as the research 
samples. The data used in this study were audited financial statements and were available 
on each bank’s website or on the website of Indonesian Stock Exchange. 
 
The method used in the present study was Vector Autoregression (VAR). An analysis with 
the VAR method was carried out in sequence to answer the research hypotheses. Simple 
VAR equation were presented as: 
 
𝑦1𝑡 = 𝛽10 + 𝛽11𝑦1𝑡−1 + 𝛼11𝑦2𝑡−1 + 𝑢1𝑡 
𝑦2𝑡 = 𝛽20 + 𝛽21𝑦2𝑡−1 + 𝛼21𝑦1𝑡−1 + 𝑢2𝑡 
 
In Matrix form VAR equation were 
 
(
𝑦1𝑡
𝑦2𝑡
) = (
𝛽10
𝛽20
) + (
𝛽11𝛼11
𝛼21𝛽21
) + (
𝑦1𝑡−1
𝑦2𝑡−1
) = (
𝑢1𝑡
𝑢2𝑡
) 
𝑦𝑡  =      𝛽0     +           𝛽1𝑦𝑡−1             +      𝑢1𝑡 
2x1       2x1 (2x2)   (2x1)        (2x1) 
 
In order to answer the first hypothesis, the Granger’s causality test was conducted. The 
proposed H0 stated that there was no causal relationship between interbank pressures, 
while Ha showed the contrary. H0 was rejected if the probability value was smaller than 
the real values. To answer the second hypothesis, VAR test was conducted to see the 
effect of shocks from one bank to other banks. 
 
 
Result and Discussion 
 
Granger’s Causality Test 
 
To answer the first hypothesis, the granger Causality test was carried out by using α of 
5%, showing a result that there was a causal relationship between banks in both one-way 
and two-way causalities. Statistically, one-way causality occurred between Bank CIMB 
Niaga which affected BTN, BCA, BRI, BNI, Commonwealth Bank Indonesia, Bank Permata, 
Bank Mega, KEB Hana Bank, and J-Trust Indonesia Bank. Meanwhile, Bank BCA influenced 
Bank Mayapada International, Maybank Indonesia, Bank Mega, and Bank Resona 
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Perdania. BRI influenced BNI, Bank Ekspor Indonesia, Mayapada Bank, and Bank 
Nusantara Parahyangan. Bank Mandiri affected BRI, BNI, and Commonwealth Indonesia. 
Bank Commowealth Indonesia influenced BNI and Bank Mega. BTN affected BCA. BNI 
affected Bank Danamon Indonesia. J-Trust Bank affected BNI. Mayapada International 
Bank affected BNI. Bank Permata influenced Bank Mayapada International and BNI. Bank 
Woori Saudara Indonesia influenced BNI. Finally, Bank Ekspor Indonesia affected 
Maybank Indonesia and Bank Resona Perdania. In addition, the results of the granger test 
also showed that, statically, there was a two-way relationship or causality between BCA 
and Bank Mandiri. 
 
Vector Auto Regression Analysis 
 
Based on the granger causality test, it could be seen that there was an interbank causality 
in both one-way and two-way causalities. Next, a VAR analysis was conducted to 
determine the impact of shocks from bank j towards bank i. Although it was statistically 
significant, the impact of shocks was not always positive. Based on the results of the tests, 
there were many cases indicating that the impact of the shock was negative, which meant 
that bank i could take advantage of the shock that occurred in bank j. 
 
Large banks had large asset values so that they could reduce the risk of the shock impacts 
that occurred in other banks. In some cases, the shock of other banks gave benefits to the 
aforementioned banks. One of the banks with large assets was BNI. Based on the results 
of the VAR analysis, if the risk in BCA four periods ago changed by 1%, it could reduce 
BNI's risk in this period by 2.78837%. Moreover, if the BTN risk three periods ago 
increased by 1%, it would reduce BNI’s risk at this period by 2.09282%. The same thing 
happened with the increase in Bank Danamon's risk in the last period, Bank Ekspor 
Indonesia a period ago and three periods ago, Indonesian J-Trust Bank one period and 
three periods ago, KEB Hana Bank one period ago and three periods ago, Bank Mayapada 
two periods ago and four periods ago, Maybank Bank last period and three periods ago, 
Bank Mega four periods ago, Bank Nusantara Parahyangan two periods ago and four 
periods ago, Bank Permata last period and three periods ago, and Bank Resona Perdania 
two periods ago and four periods ago; would statistically reduce BNI’s risk by a percentage 
reflected in Table 1 (Appendix). 
 
The Bank shocks could also be caused by the condition of the bank in the past. As an 
example, for BNI, the shock occurring last period, two periods ago, and three periods ago, 
led to the shocks in the current period. BCA, as one of the national private banks with 
large assets, also experienced shocks due to the past conditions. In several banks with 
not-too-large assets, the effects of shocks did not cause significant shock to other banks. 
An example could be seen from Bank Mayapada International in which there were not 
many banks affected by the shock. In addition, the interbank shocks, even though they 
were statistically positive, were not too significant because the shock did not directly 
cause default conditions to other banks. This condition also did not cause a systemic crisis 
in banks in Indonesia. It supported a research conducted by Zakaria (2015) which stated 
that contagion occurred due to the agents in financial systems that were connected 
through financial market transactions directly or indirectly. This was also in line with the 
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results of the research done by Christiawan and Arfianto (2013) showing that there was 
interbank causality, and the impact of shocks did not directly cause complacency to other 
banks. The limitation of this study was that it only dealt with the contagion risk in terms 
of the market risk as stated in the researches done by Memmel & Sachs (2013) and 
Philippas, et al. (2015), and also it did not take the contagion risk into account in terms of 
the liquidity as stated in Gai, Jenkinson, & Kapadia (2007), Gai, et al. (2011), Gauthier, et 
al. (2010), Allen and Gale (2000), Allen, Carletti, and Gale, (2009), Chen, Chen, & Gerlach 
(2013),  Ahelegbey and Giudici (2014). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study aims at analyzing the pressures and the impacts of the shock effect from one 
bank to other banks. The spread of the contagion risk in this study was measured from 
the interbank market risk channels by taking the bank vulnerabilities in interbank account 
interactions, the risks of the securities market and foreign exchange market. The test 
results show that there is one-way and two-way causalities, for two-way relationship or 
causality it found that there is causality between BCA and Bank Mandiri. In addition, there 
is also an impact of the shock from banks j towards bank i, of which the statistics are not 
always positive. This shows that there is pressure among the banks in Indonesia. Although 
statistically there are inter-bank shocks, the shock value tends to be small so that it does 
not lead to direct systemic crisis. The limitation in this study is that it does not take the 
distribution channel in terms of liquidity, therefore, the future studies are expected to 
take the contagion risk assessment in terms of liquidity into account. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1 VAR Analysis 
Bank Bank Respon Bank Bank Respon Bank Bank Respon 
BCA BCA (-2) -3.54 BNI BCA (-4) -2.79 BRI BCA (-2) -2.36 
BCA (-3) -3.25 BNI (-1) -2.78 BCA (-3) -2.91 
BRI (-1) 1.84 BNI (-2) -3.53 BNI (-1) -2.14 
BRI (-2) -3.51 BNI (-3) -3.2 BRI (-2) -2.54 
BRI (-3) -2.68 BRI (-2) 4.33 BRI (-4) -1.88 
BRI (-4) -2.52 BRI (-3) 4.79 BTN (-1) 5.97 
BTN (-1) 5.76 BTN (-3) -2.09 BTN (-4) -4.19 
BTN (-2) -2.09 Danamon (-
1) 
-2.04 CIMB Niaga 
(-1) 
4.74 
BTN (-4) -4.01 Ekspor_Ind (-
1) 
-2.6 CIMB Niaga 
(-2) 
3.63 
CIMB Niaga 
(-1) 
4.10 Ekspor_Ind (-
2) 
2.71 CIMB Niaga 
(-3) 
3.1 
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Bank Bank Respon Bank Bank Respon Bank Bank Respon 
BCA CIMB Niaga (-
2) 
3.48  Ekspor_Ind 
(-3) 
-2.77  
BTN 
Mega (-1) 2.27 
CIMB Niaga (-
3) 
2.86 Ekspor_Ind 
(-4) 
2.76 Mega (-2) -2.02 
Danamon (-2) -2.24 Jtrust_Ind 
(-1) 
-2.65 Mega (-3) 1.71 
Ekspor_Ind (-
1) 
2.01 Jtrust_Ind 
(-2) 
2.73 Resona_Perd
ania (-1) 
2.24 
Ekspor_Ind (-
2) 
-1.95 Jtrust_Ind 
(-3) 
-2.74 Woori_SDRA 
(-1) 
1.8 
Ekspor_Ind (-
3) 
1.92 Jtrust_Ind 
(-4) 
2.7 Woori_SDRA 
(-2) 
-1.93 
Ekspor_Ind (-
4) 
-1.93 KEBHana (-
1) 
-2.94 Woori_SDRA 
(-3) 
2.00 
Mandiri (-4) -1.82 KEBHana (-
2) 
2.94 Woori_SDRA 
(-4) 
-2.09 
Maybank (-1) 2.07 KEBHana (-
3) 
-2.88 BCA (-2) 2.12 
Maybank (-2) -2.05 KEBHana (-
4) 
2.76 BCA (-3) 2.99 
COMMO
N 
_WEALT
H 
BCA (-2) -2.16  Nusantara_
Parahy (-4) 
-2.61  KEBHana (-1) -1.92 
 BCA (-3) -2.94  Permata (-
1) 
-2.77  KEBHana (-2) 2.28 
 BNI (-1) 1.98  Permata (-
2) 
2.84  KEBHana (-3) -2.39 
 BRI (-2) -3.02  Permata (-
3) 
-2.79  KEBHana (-4) 2.42 
 BRI (-3) -2.89  Permata (-
4) 
2.71  Mandiri (-4) 1.9 
 BTN (-1) 2.94  Resona_Per
dania (-1) 
1.90  Mayapada (-
3) 
1.86 
 BTN (-4) -2.47  Resona_Per
dania (-2) 
-2.57  Mayapada (-
4) 
-2.09 
 Ekspor_Ind (-
1) 
2.26  Resona_Per
dania (-3) 
2.53  Maybank (-1) -2.45 
 Ekspor_Ind (-
2) 
-2.30  Resona_Per
dania (-4) 
-2.53  Maybank (-2) 2.52 
 Ekspor_Ind (-
3) 
2.34 CIMB 
NIAGA 
BCA (-2) -2.24  Maybank (-3) -2.58 
 Ekspor_Ind (-
4) 
-2.37  BCA (-3) -2.98  Maybank (-4) 2.63 
 KEBHana (-2) -1.7  BNI (-1) -3.04  Mega (-1) -2.35 
 KEBHana (-3) 1.81  BRI (-1) 2.23  Mega (-2) 1.89 
 KEBHana (-4) -1.83  BRI (-2) -2.45  Permata (-3) -1.69 
 Mandiri (-4) -1.68  BRI (-3) -2.13  Permata (-4) 1.9 
 Maybank (-1) 1.98  BRI (-4) -2.62  Woori_SDRA 
(-1) 
-2.83 
 Maybank (-2) -2.04  BTN (-1) 3.44  Woori_SDRA 
(-2) 
3.01 
 Maybank (-3) 2.10  BTN (-4) -2.24  Woori_SDRA 
(-3) 
-3.18 
 Maybank (-4) -2.16  CIMB_Niag
a (-1) 
2.43  Woori_SDRA 
(-4) 
3.32 
 Mega (-1) 2.38  Danamon (-
4) 
-1.76 JTRUS
T 
INDON
ESIA 
BCA (-3) -2.11 
 Mega (-2) -2.07  Ekspor_Ind 
(-1) 
2.66  BNI (-1) -2.501 
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Bank Bank Respon Bank Bank Respon Bank Bank Respon 
 Woori_SDRA 
(-1) 
2.75  Ekspor_Ind 
(-2) 
-2.7  BRI (-2) -3.06 
 Woori_SDRA 
(-2) 
-2.87  Ekspor_Ind 
(-3) 
2.74  BRI (-3) -2.72 
 Woori_SDRA 
(-3) 
3.01  Ekspor_Ind 
(-4) 
-2.8  BRI (-4) -1.99 
 Woori_SDRA 
(-4) 
-3.16  Jtrust_Ind 
(-3) 
1.84  BTN (-1) 4.49 
EKSPOR 
INDONES
IA 
BCA (-2) -1.7  Jtrust_Ind 
(-4) 
-2.11  BTN (-4) -3.52 
 BNI (-1) 2.6  KEBHana (-
1) 
2.16  CIMB Niaga (-
1) 
4.34 
 CIMB Niaga (-
1) 
-3.18  KEBHana (-
2) 
-2.43  CIMB Niaga (-
2) 
2.63 
 CIMB Niaga (-
2) 
-2.67  KEBHana (-
3) 
2.52  CIMB Niaga (-
3) 
2.29 
 CIMB Niaga (-
3) 
-2.31  KEBHana (-
4) 
-2.54  Danamon (-4) -1.88 
 Danamon (-1) 1.9  Mandiri (-4) -2.61  Ekspor_Ind (-
1) 
2.09 
 Danamon (-2) 3.36  Mayapada 
(-2) 
1.90  Ekspor_Ind (-
2) 
-2.08 
 Danamon (-3) 2.19  Mayapada 
(-3) 
-2.12  Ekspor_Ind (-
3) 
2.09 
 Jtrust_Ind (-1) 1.81  Mayapada 
(-4) 
2.31  Ekspor_Ind (-
4) 
-2.12 
 Jtrust_Ind (-2) -1.7  Maybank (-
1) 
2.44  KEBHana (-1) -1.68 
 Mega (-1) -2.99  Maybank (-
2) 
-2.53  KEBHana (-3) 1.76 
 Mega (-2) 2.77  Maybank (-
3) 
2.64  KEBHana (-4) -1.76 
 Mega (-3) -2.52  Maybank (-
4) 
-2.73  Maybank (-1) 1.83 
 Mega (-4) 2.17  Nusantara_
Parahy (-4) 
1.89  Maybank (-2) -1.87 
 Nusantara_Pa
rahy (-1) 
-2.27  Permata (-
2) 
-1.73  Maybank (-3) 1.91 
 Nusantara_Pa
rahy (-2) 
2.09  Permata (-
3) 
2.01  Maybank (-4) -1.94 
 Nusantara_Pa
rahy (-3) 
-1.85  Permata (-
4) 
-2.16  Woori_SDRA 
(-2) 
-1.82 
 Resona_Perd
ania (-2) 
2.20  Resona_Per
dania (-4) 
1.7  Woori_SDRA 
(-3) 
1.96 
 Resona_Perd
ania (-3) 
-1.99  Woori_SDR
A (-1) 
1.99  Woori_SDRA 
(-4) 
-2.06 
 Resona_Perd
ania (-4) 
1.72  Woori_SDR
A (-2) 
-2.13 KEB 
HANA 
INDON
ESIA 
BCA (-3) 1.67 
 Woori_SDRA 
(-1) 
-2.82  Woori_SDR
A (-3) 
-2.28  BRI (-2) 3.00 
 Woori_SDRA 
(-2) 
2.49  Woori_SDR
A (-4) 
-2.42  BRI (-3) 3.18 
 Woori_SDRA 
(-3) 
-2.11 DANAM
ON 
BNI (-1) 2.56  BRI (-4) 1.95 
 Woori_SDRA 
(-4) 
1.77  BRI (-3) 2.15  Commonweal
th (-1) 
-1.96 
 C -2.29  Danamon  
(-1) 
-1.83  Commonweal
th (-2) 
1.912 
MANDIRI BCA (-2) 1.96  Ekspor_Ind 
(-1) 
-2.41  Commonweal
th (-3) 
-1.89 
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Bank Bank Respon Bank Bank Respon Bank Bank Respon 
 BCA (-3) 2.82  Ekspor_Ind 
(-2) 
2.56  Commonweal
th (-4) 
1.9 
 BRI (-1) -2.19  Ekspor_Ind 
(-3) 
-2.67  Ekspor_Ind (-
1) 
-3.22 
 BRI (-2) 3.01  Ekspor_Ind 
(-4) 
2.75  Ekspor_Ind (-
2) 
3.36 
 BRI (-3) 2.78  Jtrust_Ind 
(-1) 
-2.88  Ekspor_Ind (-
3) 
-3.48 
 BRI (-4) 2.57  Jtrust_Ind 
(-2) 
3.05  Ekspor_Ind (-
4) 
3.578 
 BTN (-1) -3.31  Jtrust_Ind 
(-3) 
-3.11  Jtrust_Ind (-1) -2.33 
 BTN (-4) 2.52  Jtrust_Ind 
(-4) 
3.12  Jtrust_Ind (-2) 2.75 
 CIMB Niaga (-
1) 
-2.81  KEBHana (-
1) 
-2.93  Jtrust_Ind (-3) -3.02 
 CIMB Niaga (-
2) 
-2.06  KEBHana (-
2) 
2.93  Jtrust_Ind (-4) 3.21 
 Commonweal
th (-1) 
-2.01  KEBHana (-
3) 
-2.95  KEBHana (-1) -3.23 
 Commonweal
th (-2) 
1.84  KEBHana (-
4) 
2.95  KEBHana (-2) 3.43 
 Commonweal
th (-3) 
-1.71  Mandiri (-4) 1.96  KEBHana (-3) -3.48 
 Ekspor_Ind (-
1) 
-3.04  Mayapada 
(-1) 
3.01  KEBHana (-4) 3.48 
 Ekspor_Ind (-
2) 
3.05  Mayapada 
(-2) 
-3.09  Mandiri (-2) 1.77 
 Ekspor_Ind (-
3) 
-3.07  Mayapada 
(-3) 
3.1  Mandiri (-4) 2.53 
 Ekspor_Ind (-
4) 
3.10  Mayapada 
(-4) 
-3.1  Mayapada (-
1) 
2.78 
 Jtrust_Ind (-4) 1.89  Maybank (-
1) 
-2.07  Mayapada (-
2) 
-3.08 
 KEBHana (-1) -2.24  Maybank (-
2) 
2.22  Mayapada (-
3) 
3.24 
 KEBHana (-2) 2.54  Maybank (-
3) 
-2.36  Mayapada (-
4) 
-3.35 
 KEBHana (-3) -2.62  Maybank (-
4) 
2.46  Maybank (-1) -3.01 
 KEBHana (-4) 2.60  Mega (-2) -1.96  Maybank (-2) 3.16 
 Mandiri (-4) 2.131  Mega (-3) 2.40  Maybank (-3) -3.32 
 Mayapada (-
2) 
-1.69  Mega (-4) -2.68  Maybank (-4) 3.44 
 Mayapada (-
3) 
1.98  Nusantara_
Parahy (-1) 
2.59  Mega (-4) -1.76 
 Mayapada (-
4) 
-2.20  Nusantara_
Parahy (-2) 
-2.87  Nusantara_Pa
rahy (-1) 
1.72 
 Maybank (-1) -2.88  Nusantara_
Parahy (-3) 
3.03  Nusantara_Pa
rahy (-2) 
-2.29 
 Maybank (-2) 2.95  Nusantara_
Parahy (-4) 
-3.11  Nusantara_Pa
rahy (-3) 
2.73 
 Maybank (-3) -3.01  Permata (-
1) 
-2.96  Nusantara_Pa
rahy (-4) 
-3.05 
 Maybank (-4) 3.05  Permata (-
2) 
3.09  Permata (-1) -2.46 
 Mega (-1) -2.18  Permata (-
3) 
-3.10  Permata (-2) 2.95 
 Mega (-2) 1.74  Permata (-
4) 
3.085  Permata (-3) -3.15 
 Permata (-3) -1.80  Resona_Per
dania (-2) 
-2.83  Permata (-4) 3.25 
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 Permata (-4) 2.01  Resona_Per
dania (-3) 
3.01  Resona_Perd
ania (-2) 
-2.05 
 Woori_SDRA 
(-1) 
-3.01  Resona_Per
dania (-4) 
-3.08  Resona_Perd
ania (-3) 
2.58 
 Woori_SDRA 
(-2) 
3.17 MAYBA
NK 
INDONE
SIA 
BNI (-1) -5.06  Resona_Perd
ania (-4) 
-2.90 
 Woori_SDRA 
(-3) 
-3.34  BNI (-2) -2.62  Woori_SDRA 
(-3) 
-1.88 
 Woori_SDRA 
(-4) 
3.51  BNI (-3) -2.54  Woori_SDRA 
(-4) 
2.11 
 C -1.85  BTN (-1) 3.15 MEGA BCA (-2) -1.82 
 BNI (-1) -2.01  CIMB Niaga 
(-1) 
4.46  BCA (-3) -2.55 
 BTN (-1) 2.59  CIMB Niaga 
(-2) 
2.85  BRI (-2) -2.19 
 BTN (-4) -1.68  CIMB Niaga 
(-3) 
2.50  BTN (-1) 4.52 
 CIMB Niaga (-
1) 
2.89  Danamon (-
2) 
-1.87  BTN (-2) -1.77 
 CIMB Niaga (-
2) 
1.92  Danamon (-
4) 
-2.14  BTN (-4) -3.29 
 CIMB Niaga (-
3) 
1.76  Resona_Per
dania (-1) 
-1.84  CIMB Niaga (-
1) 
2.53 
NUSANT
ARA 
PARAH-
YANGAN 
BCA (-3) -1.99 RESON
A 
PERDA
NIA 
Jtrust_Ind 
(-1) 
4.22  CIMB Niaga (-
2) 
3.18 
 BNI (-1) -3.33  Jtrust_Ind 
(-2) 
-3.66  CIMB Niaga (-
3) 
2.54 
 BRI (-1) 2.05  Jtrust_Ind 
(-3) 
3.23  CIMB Niaga (-
4) 
1.95 
 BRI (-2) -3.38  Jtrust_Ind 
(-4) 
-2.89  Danamon (-2) -2.38 
 BRI (-3) -3.29  KEBHana (-
1) 
2.31  Jtrust_Ind (-1) -1.83 
 BRI (-4) -2.59  KEBHana (-
2) 
-1.92  Mega (-1) 4.12 
 BTN (-1) 3.74  KEBHana (-
3) 
1.78  Mega (-2) -3.84 
 BTN (-4) -2.89  KEBHana (-
4) 
-1.75  Mega (-3) 3.35 
 CIMB Niaga (-
1) 
3.73  Mayapada 
(-1) 
-3.60  Mega (-4) -2.65 
 CIMB Niaga (-
2) 
1.72  Mayapada 
(-2) 
3.09  Nusantara_Pa
rahy (-1) 
2.48 
 Danamon (-4) -2.03  Mayapada 
(-3) 
-2.75  Nusantara_Pa
rahy (-2) 
-1.88 
 Ekspor_Ind (-
1) 
3.45  Mayapada 
(-4) 
2.52  Permata (-1) -1.76 
 Ekspor_Ind (-
2) 
-3.51  Mega (-1) -4.92  Resona_Perd
ania (-1) 
2.72 
 Ekspor_Ind (-
3) 
3.57  Mega (-2) 5.09  Resona_Perd
ania (-2) 
-2.49 
 Ekspor_Ind (-
4) 
-3.63  Mega (-3) -4.85  Woori_SDRA 
(-1) 
3.63 
 Jtrust_Ind (-1) 2.02  Mega (-4) 4.27  Woori_SDRA 
(-2) 
-3.53 
 Jtrust_Ind (-2) -2.47  Nusantara_
Parahy (-1) 
-4.62  Woori_SDRA 
(-3) 
3.41 
 Jtrust_Ind (-3) 2.79  Nusantara_
Parahy (-2) 
4.09  Woori_SDRA 
(-4) 
-3.37 
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 Jtrust_Ind (-4) -3.04  Nusantara_
Parahy (-3) 
-3.62 PERM
ATA 
BNI (-1) -4.69 
 KEBHana (-1) 3.04  Nusantara_
Parahy (-4) 
3.19  BNI (-3) -2.01 
 KEBHana (-2) -3.29  Permata (-
1) 
4.06  CIMB Niaga (-
1) 
1.82 
 KEBHana (-3) -3.36  Permata (-
2) 
-3.37  Resona_Perd
ania (-1) 
-1.83 
 KEBHana (-4) -3.36  Permata (-
3) 
2.94 WOOR
I 
SAUDA
RA 
Ekspor_Ind (-
2) 
1.69 
 Mandiri (-2) -1.80  Permata (-
4) 
-2.67  Ekspor_Ind (-
3) 
-1.76 
 Mandiri (-4) -2.56  Resona_Per
dania (-1) 
-5.11  Ekspor_Ind (-
4) 
1.81 
 Mayapada (-
1) 
-2.57  Resona_Per
dania (-2) 
4.57  Mandiri (-4) 1.67 
 Mayapada (-
2) 
2.87  Resona_Per
dania (-3) 
-3.89  Woori_SDRA 
(-3) 
-1.69 
 Mayapada (-
3) 
-3.07  Resona_Per
dania (-4) 
3.35  Woori_SDRA 
(-4) 
1.79 
 Mayapada (-
4) 
3.23  Woori_SDR
A (-1) 
-3.72    
 Maybank (-1) 3.06  Woori_SDR
A (-2) 
3.44    
 Maybank (-2) -3.17  Woori_SDR
A (-3) 
-3.17    
 Maybank (-3) 3.27  Woori_SDR
A (-4) 
2.98    
 Maybank (-4) -3.34       
 Nusantara_Pa
rahy (-2) 
1.95       
 Nusantara_Pa
rahy (-3) 
-2.46       
 Nusantara_Pa
rahy (-4) 
2.83       
 Permata (-1) 2.08       
 Permata (-2) -2.69       
 Permata (-3) 2.96       
 Permata (-4) -3.07       
 Resona_Perd
ania (-3) 
-2.26       
 Resona_Perd
ania (-4) 
2.60       
 Woori_SDRA 
(-1) 
1.88       
 Woori_SDRA 
(-2) 
-2.11       
 Woori_SDRA 
(-3) 
2.34       
 Woori_SDRA 
(-4) 
-2.51       
 C 2.04       
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